SCIENCE AS RADICAL KNOWLEDGE
Palabras clave:
Proliferación de Teorías, Verdad Relativa, Relativismo Evolutivo, Realismo, Epistemología Evolutiva, Lakatos, Feyerabend, GalileoResumen
La visión de que la ciencia es típicamente un proceso acumulativo y progresivo, como lo sugieren algunos historiadores de la ciencia y algunos realistas científicos, está minada tanto por la historia como por consideraciones evolutivas sobre la natura- leza de la ciencia. Los intentos de utilizar la biología evolutiva para retratar el desarrollo científico como continuo se basan en desafortunadas analogías con la evolución de la vida. Una aplicación adecuada de la biología evolutiva, en combinación con la neurociencia, derrota el caso del realismo en cuestión y conduce a la comprensión de que la ciencia no solo está abierta a la transformación radical, como lo indica la historia, sino que debería ser así. Los enfoques no evolutivos para la continuidad histó- rica de la ciencia, como el de Lakatos, no tienen mejor suerte. Como discutiré, la ciencia es una forma radical de conocimiento.
Citas
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