HIGHER-LEVEL PROPERTIES, COGNITION AND PHENOMENAL CONTRAST

Abstract

Siegel’s (2010) phenomenal contrast argument aims to ensure the admissibility of higher-level properties in the contents of perception. In particular, the argument supports the representational admissibility of natural kind properties such as being a pine tree and explains in this way the phenomenal contrast between those experiences we would have before and after learning to recognize pine trees. This article critically evaluates the commitments and assumptions of this argument with the purpose of identifying three difficulties that weaken Siegel’s (2010) proposal. First, the argument assumes that perception is cognitively penetrable, a hypothesis for which no independent support is provided. Second, while there is reason to think that some higher-level properties can be represented in perception, natural-kind properties like being a pine tree do not qualify. Finally, there are alternative explanations of the phenomenal contrast at play that do not require the admissibility of higher-level properties, much less cognitive penetrability.