Computacionalismo después del dinamicismo y el enactivismo: Una respuesta mecanicista

Gabriel Salas Candia; Mario Villalobos Kirmayr; Eric Pezoa Campos

doi:10.64966/rl.2196

Autores

Gabriel Salas Candia Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades, Universidad de Chile https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4393-309X
Mario Villalobos Kirmayr Escuela de Psicología y Filosofía, Universidad de Tarapacá https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0567-2888
Eric Pezoa Campos Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad de Chile

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.64966/rl.2196

Palavras-chave:

computacionalismo, enactivismo, dinamicismo, mecanicismo, sistema nervioso

Resumo

Este artículo examina dos objeciones influyentes al computacionalismo: la objeción dinamicista, según la cual la computación no logra captar la temporalidad constitutiva de la cognición, y la objeción enactivista, según la cual los sistemas computacionales son heterónomos y, por ello, incompatibles con la autonomía propia de los sistemas cognitivos. El objetivo es mostrar que tales objeciones no bastan para descartar una caracterización computacional del sistema nervioso si la noción de computación se formula en términos mecanicistas. En este marco, un sistema computacional se entiende como un mecanismo cuya función es manipular vehículos medio-independientes de acuerdo con una regla. Sobre esa base, se argumenta que una caracterización computacional mecanicista del sistema nervioso es compatible con una caracterización de éste como sistema dinámico y autónomo. Ello se debe a que sus mecanismos operan sobre vehículos neurales cuyo papel funcional depende de rasgos temporalmente estructurados, como la tasa y el timing de los trenes de spikes, de modo que la temporalidad pasa a formar parte de la individuación misma del proceso computacional. A su vez, esta caracterización no entra en conflicto con la autonomía del sistema nervioso, porque la noción mecanicista de computación no exige heteronomía, organización lineal de input-output ni metas impuestas externamente. La conclusión es que las objeciones basadas en temporalidad y autonomía no excluyen, por sí solas, una caracterización computacional mecanicista del sistema nervioso.

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