COGNICIÓN, COMPUTACIÓN Y SISTEMAS DINÁMICOS:
VÍAS PARA UNA POSIBLE INTEGRACIÓN TEÓRICA
Palabras clave:
clausura funcional, representación, ciencia cognitiva, teoría de sistemas dinámicos, Teoría computacionalResumen
Tradicionalmente, la teoría computacional (computacionalismo) y la teoría de sistemas dinámicos (dinamicismo) se han enfren- tado como dos paradigmas opuestos e incompatibles en ciencia cognitiva. Frente a esto, se han hecho esfuerzos conciliatorios e integracionistas que buscan, principalmente, acercar el dinamicismo al computacionalismo a expensas de su postura anti-repre- sentacionalista. En este trabajo, basándonos en la teoría computacional mecanicista de Piccinini y la noción de clausura funcional, exploramos una vía de integración diferente. Intentamos acercar el computacionalismo al dinamicismo a expensas de su postura representacionalista, invitándolo además a reconocer el carácter funcionalmente cerrado de (ciertos) sistemas computacionales.
Citas
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Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963). The structure of behavior. Boston: Beacon Press.
Piccinini, G. (2004). Functionalism, computationalism, and mental content. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 34(3), 375-410.
Piccinini, G.(2007). Computing mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 74(4), 501-526.
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Port, R. & Van Gelder, T. J. (1995). Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1984). Computing and Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Smolensky, P. (1986). The constituent structure of connectionist mental states: A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 26, 37-163.
Sprevak, M. (2010). Computation, individuation, and the received view on representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 40, 260-270.
Turing, A. M. (1937). On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 42(2), 230-265.
Van Gelder, T. J. (1995). What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?. Journal of Philosophy, 92, 345-381.
Van Gelder, T. J. (1998), The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 615–65.
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Wheeler, M. (2005). Reconstructing the Cognitive World. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Ashby, W. R.(1960). Design for a brain. London: Chapman & Hall.
Bechtel, W. (1998). Representations and cognitive explanations: assessing the dynamicist’s challenge in cognitive science. Cognitive Science, 22, 295-318.
Bridgeman, B. (1998). The dynamical model is a Perceptron. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 631-632.
Clark, A. (1989). Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body and world together again. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dennet, D. C. (1998). “Revolution, no! Reform, si!”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 636-637.
Dietrich, E. & Markman, A. B. (1998). All information processing entails computation, or, If R. A. Fisher had been a cognitive scientist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 637-638.
Eliasmith, C. (1998). Dynamical models and van Gelder’s dynamicism: Two different things. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 616-665.
Fodor, J. A. & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture. Cognition, 28, 3-71.
Fodor, J. A. (1998). Concepts. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Garson, J. (2003). The introduction of information into neurobiology. Philosophy of Science, 70(5), 926-936.
Grush, R. (2004). The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 377-442.
Maturana, H. (1970/1980). Biology of cognition. En H. Maturana & F. Varela, (Eds.), Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (pp. 5-56). Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Maturana, H. (1975). The organization of the living: A theory of the living organization. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 7(3), 313-332.
Maturana, H. (2003). The Biological foundations of self-consciousness and the physical domain of existence. En N. Luhmann, H. Maturana, M. Namiki, V. Redder & F. Varela (Eds.), Beobachter: Convergenz der erkenntnistheorien? (pp. 47-117). München: Willhelm Fink Verlag.
McClelland, J., Rumerhalt, D. & the PDP research group. (1986). Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963). The structure of behavior. Boston: Beacon Press.
Piccinini, G. (2004). Functionalism, computationalism, and mental content. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 34(3), 375-410.
Piccinini, G.(2007). Computing mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 74(4), 501-526.
Piccinini, G.(2008). Computation without representation. Philosophical studies, 137(2), 205-241.
Piccinini, G & Scarantino, A. (2010). Computation vs. Information processing: why their difference matters to cognitive science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41, 237-246.
Piccinini, G. & Scarantino, A. (2011). Information processing, computation and cognition. Journal of Biological Physics, 37(1), 1-38.
Port, R. & Van Gelder, T. J. (1995). Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1984). Computing and Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Smolensky, P. (1986). The constituent structure of connectionist mental states: A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 26, 37-163.
Sprevak, M. (2010). Computation, individuation, and the received view on representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 40, 260-270.
Turing, A. M. (1937). On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 42(2), 230-265.
Van Gelder, T. J. (1995). What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?. Journal of Philosophy, 92, 345-381.
Van Gelder, T. J. (1998), The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 615–65.
Villalobos, M. (2015). The Biological Roots of Cognition and the Social Origins of Mind (PhD Thesis). Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh.
Villalobos, M & Ward, D. (2014). Living systems: autopoiesis, autonomy and enaction. Philosophy and Technology, 28, 225-239. doi: 10.1007/s13347-014-0154-y
Wheeler, M. (2005). Reconstructing the Cognitive World. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge: MIT Press.
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Publicado
20-03-2016
Cómo citar
Villalobos, M., & Dewhurst, J. (2016). COGNICIÓN, COMPUTACIÓN Y SISTEMAS DINÁMICOS:: VÍAS PARA UNA POSIBLE INTEGRACIÓN TEÓRICA. LÍMITE Revista Interdisciplinaria De Filosofía Y Psicología, 11(36). Recuperado a partir de https://revistalimite.uta.cl/index.php/limite/article/view/57
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