PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BLIND VISION
Keywords:
Blindsight, consciousness, visual perception, sensorimotor hypothesisAbstract
Blindsight is a neuropsychological disorder that involves seeing without knowing that you are seeing. These neuropsychological- reports have generated philosophical interpretations about the nature of consciousness. Throught blindsight, some philosophers have argued that there exist a phenomenal aspect of consciousness; some others have denied its existence. For cognitive scientists, blindsight have allowed to demonstrate the presence of multiple cognitive processes involved in visual perception. But blindsight has also produced a new model of sensorimotor processing in which consciousness is involved. The philosophical implications of blindsight, have moved cognitive models to epistemological grounds while also have introduced the possibility of unconsciousness in philosophical discussion.
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