GHOST IN THE MACHINE?

SOME OBJECTIONS TO RYLE FOR THE KNOWLEDGE OF BEHAVIORISTS

Abstract

Gilbert Ryle elaborated a critique of the Cartesian conception of mind from the field of philosophy in his work The concept of mind. The analyses and arguments presented in this study are still recurrent among psychologists, particularly those with a behavioral orientation, with the purpose of showing the mistakes that characterize Cartesian dualism that today continues with great acceptance in psychological theories. However, psychologists are mostly unaware, due to little or no philosophical training, that followers of Cartesian dualism have developed novel arguments that questioning various points of Ryle’s philosophy, thus providing an apparent coherent and solid system that is attractive to those psychologists who adhere to the mind and body union and interaction approach. The purpose of this paper is to expose some of the arguments of the opponents of Rylean philosophy in the facing the possible implications in psychology.