MODAL RATIONALISM, NATURALISM AND EMPIRICIST SKEPTICISM
Keywords:
intuitions, experimental philosophy, rationalism, reliability, skepticismAbstract
Recently, Machery (2017) has developed a critique of philosophical practice based on hypothetical cases, the so-called method of cases. One way to question this practice and the role of intuitions is the so-called argument from unreliability. From this non-reliability a skeptical conclusion follows regarding the modal analyzes characteristic of certain philosophical arguments: the requirement of suspension of judgment concerning philosophical cases. This posit leads to maintain a philosophical immodesty regarding the epistemic limits that would not allow, for example, to solve the perennial disagreements present in the philosophical field. This in turn results in two questionable consequences of philosophical argumentation, according to Machery: dogmatism (dogmatism) and / or parochialism. My objective in this paper is to analyze what reliability notion is at stake in this negative experimental stance (negative Xphi) from the proposal developed by Goldman (2013), and to evaluate the validity of an empiricist skeptical stance, considering skepticism as prima facie speculative and, therefore, not empirically testable. If this is correct, there is a problem in a skeptical experimental position.
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