LA CIENCIA DE LA CONCIENCIA SEGÚN STANISLAS DEHAENE
Palabras clave:
decodificación cerebral, correlatos neuronales de la conciencia, Dehaene, ConcienciaResumen
El objetivo de este artículo es doble. En primer lugar, contextualizar filosóficamente la investigación neurocientífica sobre la conciencia llevada a cabo por Stanislas Dehaene, tomando como referencia fundamental su obra Consciousness and the Brain. Deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts (2014), donde presenta un programa para una ciencia de la conciencia y una síntesis de una parte relevante de la investigación reciente sobre el tema. En relación con este objetivo se introducirá la distinción entre conciencia de acceso y conciencia fenomenológica, por una parte, y la distinción entre el problema fácil y el problema difícil de la conciencia, por otra. En segundo lugar, se discutirán críticamente algunas de las propuestas de Dehaene desde un punto de vista conceptual y epistemológico, en particular, las nociones de signatura de la conciencia y de decodificación o lectura cerebral.
Citas
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