ON ENTHYMEMES AND COGNITIVE INCOMMENSURABILITY

Abstract

The thesis of incommensurability (IT), which fueled discussions in the philosophy of science for years, seemed to have been buried. Advances and developments in the philosophy of language showed an overcoming of the initial dilemmas posed by Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1962). However, one of its reappraisals came through a so-called cognitive reading proposed by Alexander Bird (2005, 2008). The conceptual core of the latter is to understand IT as resting on the cognitive practices of disciplinary agents instead of locating its origin in the theories and concepts themselves. This paper analyzes this theoretical branch, even though it argues against Bird regarding the role of enthymematic reasoning (enthymemes) in the generation of incommensurability. In opposition to his project, it is argued that enthymemes are significant generators of cognitive incommensurability, both at the disciplinary and inter-disciplinary levels.